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Whitney Levandusky* 
In re MSTG and the Shifting Role of Litigation-
Related Patent Licenses in Reasonable Royalty Rate 
Determinations 
In 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in ResQNet.com v. 
Lansa, Inc.1 opened the door to the discoverability of settlement negotiations of 
third-party patent-in-suit licenses and their eventual use in reasonable royalty 
calculations.2  With its recent decision, In re MSTG,3 the Federal Circuit confirms 
such use of settlement negotiations in patent infringement cases by declining to 
extend an evidentiary privilege.4  While on its face, this decision seems to raise 
confidentiality concerns; the decision reaffirms the role of the court in tracing the 
bounds of discovery and aligns itself with recent trends in the federal system.5  What 
remains is a new, reality-based ground for consideration in the reasonable royalty 
hypothetical6 and a set of tools for both sides to structure and approach litigation.7 
This note will present an overview of patent litigation and an overview of 
discovery to better illustrate the legal intersection the Federal Circuit analyzed to 
reach its decision to reject a settlement negotiation privilege. Then, this note will 
review the Federal Circuit’s analysis in In re MSTG before looking forward to its 
implications in patent litigation.  Ultimately, allowing prior settlement negotiations 
to factor into the reasonable royalty rate is a positive advancement for patent 
litigation, regardless of lost privacy concerns. Settlement negotiations will help 
ground the reasonable royalty rate in reality and reflect the market value of patent 
infringement. 
 
© 2014 Whitney Levandusky 
 *  J.D. Candidate, May 2014, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law. 
 1. 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
 2. See infra Part II-B. 
 3. 675 F.3d 1337 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 4. See infra Part III. 
 5. See infra Part IV-C. 
 6. See infra Part IV-A. 
 7. See infra Part IV-B. 
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I. THE CASE 
In 2009, MSTG, Inc., a South Korean corporation, filed suit against Research in 
Motion, Apple Inc., U.S. Cellular, Verizon Wireless, and AT&T Mobility for patent 
infringement.8 MSTG alleged infringement of patents No. 5,920,551,9 No. 
6,198,936,10 and No. 6,438,11311 by RIM and Apple’s creation of 3G phones and U.S. 
Cellular, Verizon, and AT&T’s distribution of these phones.12 MSTG acquired the 
patents-in-suit from the original developers, Electronics and Telecommunications 
Research Institute (ETRI).13 In an amended complaint, MSTG specifically targeted 
AT&T for marketing, distributing, and testing 3G phones, as well as providing 
access to the 3G network for users with infringing devices.14 MSTG requested 
monetary damages with prejudgment interest, attorney’s fees, and a permanent 
injunction as remedies.15 MSTG settled with all defendants except AT&T.16 AT&T 
denied all allegations, asserted non-infringement and invalidity defenses, and 
counterclaimed for declaratory judgment and an award of attorneys’ fees.17 
During discovery, AT&T motioned to compel discovery for license agreements 
and all related communications and negotiations related to the three patents at 
issue between MSTG and third parties.18  Three agreements were submitted for 
review: (1) an April 28, 2009 agreement with Nokia Corp., (2) a July 9, 2010 
agreement with RPX Corp., and (3) an April 15, 2010 agreement with Motorola 
Corp.19 AT&T claimed the documents in question were relevant to calculating the 
value of a reasonable royalty.20 The Court denied AT&T’s discovery request, stating 
that AT&T failed to meet its burden of showing why the “settlement negotiations 
 
 8. First Amended Complaint at 1, MSTG Inc. v. Research in Motion et al, No. 08 CV 7411 (N.D. Ill. 2009) 
[hereinafter “First Amended Complaint”]. 
 9. U.S. Patent No. 5,920,551 (filed Apr. 26, 1996) is a utility patent that channels and re-directs mobile 
device signals to a base station within a CDMA (code division multiple access) system. 
 10. U.S. Patent No. 6,198,936 (filed Aug. 28, 1998) is a utility patent that allows for transmission of user 
information between a mobile device and base station, using a two-step process. 
 11. U.S. Patent No. 6,438,113 (filed Aug. 28, 1998) is a utility patent for managing signals between mobile 
devices and central towers and allows for multiple users to request service simultaneously through the tower. 
 12. First Amended Complaint, supra note 8, §§ 5–9. 
 13. MSTG, Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, No. 08 C 7411, 2011 WL 221771 at *1 (N.D. Ill. 2011). 
 14. Second Amended Complaint at 16–17, MSTG Inc. v. Research in Motion et al, No. 08 CV 7411 (N.D. 
Ill. 2009). 
 15. Id. at 19. See also 35 U.S.C. §§ 284–85 (2006) (listing remedies available for patent infringement). 
 16. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 17. Answer to Second Amended Complaint and Counterclaims at 5–9, MSTG Inc. v. Research in Motion 
et al, No. 08 CV 7411 (N.D. Ill. 2009). 
 18. MSTG, Inc., 2011 WL 221771 at *2. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
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are relevant and discoverable”21 under Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure.22 
AT&T moved for reconsideration of the order denying discovery of the licenses 
and attendant communications after the production of a report by MSTG’s 
damages expert, which actively considered license agreements involving the patents-
in-suit.23  In addition to the three licenses mentioned, the report also included: (1) a 
January 26, 2010 agreement with Sanyo Electric Co.; (2) an August 30, 2010 
agreement with U.S. Cellular Corp; and, (3) a November 10, 2009 agreement with 
Apple, Inc.24 The Court reversed its prior decision, granting discovery of the 
licensing agreements because it may provide grounds for “deciding if MSTG’s prior 
licenses are . . . sufficiently comparable to the patents-in-suit to be used in 
calculating a reasonable royalty.”25 
MSTG appealed the reconsideration through a writ of mandamus to the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit.26  The review of mandamus was 
approved on grounds that the settlement negotiations may be privileged, and that 
such determination was a matter of first impression where district courts have 
split.27 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
In order to more clearly understand the Federal Circuit’s holding and its potential 
effect on future litigation, it is best not to approach in a manner of “to build a house 
you start with the roof.”28  The conclusion reached by the Federal Circuit is 
grounded in patent law, specifically using reasonable royalty rates to determine 
damages, the mechanics of discovery, and the history of privileges in the federal 
courts. First, this part lays the groundwork of patent law and litigation.29 Then, this 
part highlights the importance of the reasonable royalty rate in determining 
damages in patent suits.30 Finally, this part outlines the scope and limits of attorney-
 
 21. Id. at *14. 
 22. FED R. CIV P. 26(b)(1) states that a party may “obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter 
that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense. . . . For good cause, the court may order discovery of any matter 
relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information need not be admissible at the trial if 
the discovery appears reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.” 
 23. MSTG, Inc., 2011 WL 841437 at *1. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. at *3. 
 26. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
 27. Id. at 1342. 
 28. The title of a Franz West retrospective at the Baltimore Museum of Art (October 12, 2008 – January 4, 
2009). 
 29. See supra Part II.A.  
 30. See supra Part II.B. 
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client and work-product privileges in discovery.31 Each of these elements – the 
nature of patent litigation, the reasonable royalty rate, and the scope of privilege 
during discovery – intersect to create the issue the court addressed: Are settlement 
negotiations relevant for discovery and, if so, is their use barred by a judicial 
privilege?32 
A. Brief Overview of Patent Litigation 
Patent litigation is strongly similar to typical civil litigation – except that instead of 
showing the elements of negligence or proof of breach, a plaintiff’s attorney in 
patent law strives to show claim construction, infringement, and damages.33 First, 
the court undergoes a process of claim construction.34 In each patent, there is a 
claim, which goes to the “heart of an invention.”35 As such, before a finder of fact 
can determine whether the defendant infringed the plaintiff’s patent, the judge, as a 
matter of law, must determine the scope of the patent by reviewing evidence 
submitted by both parties. During claim construction, the patent is presumed to be 
valid, “given that there is a presumption of agency correctness.”36  The intent of this 
crucial process37 is to separate the wheat from the chaff, and establish the scope and 
subject matter of the invention and is therefore under protection of the patent.38 
In the second part of patent litigation, the finder of fact – either judge or jury – 
compares the claim after claim construction to the allegedly infringing device or 
 
 31. See supra Part II.C. 
 32. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1339. 
 33. N. Am. Container, Inc. v. Plastipak Packaging, Inc., 415 F.3d 1335, 1344 (Fed. Cir. 2005) 
(“Infringement analysis is a two step process: ‘First, the court determines the scope and meaning of the patent 
claims asserted . . . [and secondly,] the properly construed claims are compared to the allegedly infringing 
device.”) (alterations in original) (citations omitted). 
 34. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 373–74 (1996) (“[A] patent includes one or 
more ‘claims,’ which ‘particularly poin[t] out and distinctly clai[m] the subject matter which the applicant 
regards as his invention.’ . . . The claim ‘define[s] the scope of a patent grant’ and functions to forbid not only 
exact copies of an invention, but products that go to ‘the heart of an invention . . . .’ [Patent lawsuits] rest on 
allegations that the defendant ‘without authority ma[de], use[d] or [sold the] patented invention . . . .’ Victory 
in an infringement suit requires a finding that the patent claim ‘covers the alleged infringer’s product or 
process,’ which in turn necessitates a determination of ‘what the words in the claim mean.’”)(some alterations 
in original) (citations omitted). 
 35. Id. at 373. 
 36. Claire Rollor, Comment, Logic, Not Evidence, Supports a Change in Expert Testimony Standards: Why 
Evidentiary Standards Promulgated by the Supreme Court for Scientific Expert Testimony are Inappropriate and 
Inefficient When Applied in Patent Infringement Suits, 8 J. BUS. TECH. L. 313, 320 (2013). 
 37. Pauline Pelletier, The Impact of Local Patent Rules on Rate and Timing of Case Resolution Relative to 
Claim Construction: An Empirical Study of the Past Decade, 8 J. BUS. TECH. L. 451, 455–56 (2013) (“Claim 
construction is the single most important event in the course of a patent litigation. It defines the scope of the 
property right being enforced, and is often the difference between infringement and non-infringement, or 
validity and invalidity.”) (quoting Retractable Techs.v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 659 F.3d 1369, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 
2011) (en banc) (Moore, J., dissenting)). 
 38. Markman, 517 U.S. at 373. 
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process.39 The finder of fact will find that an infringement occurred if the “alleged 
infringer’s product or process” falls within the scope of the plaintiff’s patent claim.40 
However, the defendant’s device is covered by the patent claim only if the “device 
embodies every limitation of the claim.”41 In order to determine whether the 
allegedly infringing product or process falls within the plaintiff’s claim, the finder of 
fact essentially uses the patent like a checklist.  And if the finder of fact determines 
that the device checks all the boxes, then the device has infringed on the patent 
holder’s exclusive right to use the checklist. Without this satisfaction, achieved 
literally or through the doctrine of equivalents,42 there is no infringement.43 
Once infringement has been established, remedy can be given to the plaintiff 
through the statutory means of injunctive relief, damages, and attorney fees and 
costs.44  Damages may be calculated based on lost profits,45 reasonable royalties,46 
and interest.47 In cases of willful infringement, where defendants relied on opinions 
of counsel, or litigation misconduct, enhanced damages may be awarded.48 
B.  The Role of the Reasonable Royalty Rate 
Reasonable royalties have a significant bearing on determining patent damages.49 
The reasonable royalty serves as the floor of an award granted to a plaintiff for 
 
 39. Absolute Software, Inc. v. Stealth Signal, Inc., 569 F.3d 1121, 1129 (Fed. Cir. 2011). 
 40. Markman, 517 U.S. at 374. 
 41. Carroll Touch, Inc. v. Electro Mech. Sys., Inc., 15 F.3d 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Read Corp. v. 
Portec, Inc., 970 F.2d 816, 822 (Fed. Cir. 1992)). 
 42. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21 (1997) (Under the doctrine of 
equivalents, “a product or process that does not literally infringe upon the express terms of a patent claim may 
nonetheless be found to infringe if there is ‘equivalence’ between the elements of the accused product or process 
and the claimed elements of the patented invention.”). See also Machine Co. v. Murphy, 97 U.S. 120, 125 (1877) 
(stating that if two devices “perform[] substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain 
the same result,” the doctrine of equivalents is met). 
 43. Monsanto Co. v. Scruggs, 459 F.3d 1328, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2006). 
 44. 35 U.S.C. §§ 283–85 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., Hebert v. Lisle Corp., 99 F.3d 1109, 1119 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (stating that lost profits include 
diverted sales, price erosion, and increased expenditures caused by infringement). 
 46. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (stating that damages will be no “less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the 
invention by the infringer, together with interest and costs as fixed by the court”). See also Rite Hite Corp. v. 
Kelley Co., 56 F.3d 1538, 1554 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (“A patentee is entitled to no less than a reasonable royalty on an 
infringer’s sales for which the patentee has not established entitlement to lost profits.”). 
 47. See, e.g., Transmatic v. Gulton Indus., 180 F.3d 1343, 1347–48 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (stating that 
prejudgment interest is “part of a successful plaintiff’s complete compensation”). 
 48. See, e.g., Wedgetail Ltd. v. Huddleston Deluxe, Inc., 576 F.3d 1302, 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (“[O]nly a 
limited universe of circumstances warrant a finding of exceptionality in a patent case: ‘inequitable conduct 
before the PTO; litigation misconduct; vexatious, unjustified, and otherwise bad faith litigation; a frivolous suit 
or willful infringement.’”) (citations omitted). 
 49. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337, 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
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infringement.50 There are 15 factors used by parties and the finder of fact in 
establishing a reasonable royalty, known as the Georgia-Pacific factors.51 One factor 
– the amount the licensor and licensee would have agreed on had they entered into 
a negotiation – has developed into a method the Court applies by replicating a 
negotiation between the parties.52 An established royalty is the preferred measure of 
a reasonable royalty because it removes most of the guesswork of engaging in a 
hypothetical negotiation.53 
If no established royalty rate is available, the court often turns to the 
hypothetical negotiation – known as the “willing licensor-willing licensee”54 method 
to establish the floor of damages.55  There are various approaches to creating a 
reasonable rate from this method, including a 25% rule56 or relying on expert 
opinions.57 However, upon review of prior patent-in-suit (settlement) cases, 
granting licenses to the licensee is becoming a more common practice.58 
Alternatively, the court can look to internal profit and cost projections, rather than 
mount a theoretical negotiation, in order to determine a reasonable royalty rate.59 
In 2010, ResQNet.com v. Lansa60 opened the door to discoverability of license 
negotiations and litigation-related licenses, along with the possibility of using such 
findings in the calculation of the reasonable royalty.  ResQNet was a patent 
infringement case in which the reasonable royalty calculation was reviewable on 
appeal. In its opinion, the court acknowledged that the “most reliable license” for 
 
 50. 35 U.S.C. § 284 (2006) (“Upon finding for the claimant, the court shall award . . . damages adequate to 
compensate . . . but in no event less than a reasonable royalty for the use made of the invention by the 
infringer.”). 
 51. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (outlining 
fifteen non-exclusive factors to be taken into account in calculating a reasonable royalty: the actual royalties 
received for the patent-in-suit; rates paid by the licensee for the use of other comparable patents; nature and 
scope of the license; licensor’s practice in maintaining patent monopoly; commercial relationship between 
licensor and licensee; value of patent in generating sales of non-patented items; duration of patent and term of 
license; profitability of the product; utility and advantages of the patent; nature of the invention; extent of 
infringing use; customary portion of profit in allowing use; portion of profit to be credited to the invention; 
opinion testimony of qualified experts; and amount the licensor and licensee would have agreed on had they 
entered into a negotiation) (award modified, 446 F.2d 295 (2d Cir. 1971)). 
 52. Hanson v. Alpine Ski Area, Inc., 718 F.2d 1075, 1077 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (defining the “willing licensee-
willing licensor” rule as the question “[A]t what royalty rate would a licensee accept a license and a licensor 
grant a license if both parties genuinely wish to execute a license in an arm’s length transaction[?]”). 
 53. LAWRENCE M. SUNG & JEFF E. SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW HANDBOOK, 7:11 Damages – reasonable royalty 
(2012). 
 54. Lucent Tech., Inc. v. Gateway, Inc., 580 F.3d 1301, 1324 (Fed. Cir. 2009).  
 55. 35 U.S.C. § 284. 
 56. See, e.g., Uniloc USA, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., 632 F.3d 1292, 1311 (2011) (stating that the 25% rule 
divides profits such that 25% goes to the licensor and 75% goes to the licensee). 
 57. Jane Lehman et al., Expert Testimony, 60 AM. JUR. 2D Patents § 909 (2012). 
 58. See supra Part III. 
 59. TWM Mfg. Co. v. Dura Corp. 789 F.2d 895, 900 (Fed. Cir. 1986). 
 60. 594 F.3d 860 (Fed. Cir. 2010). 
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the purpose of the royalty rate came from litigation61 and found that the district 
court’s calculation of the reasonable royalty was in error.62 The court also included a 
note that, on remand, the court could “also consider the panoply of ‘events and 
facts that . . . . could not have been known to or predicted by the hypothesized 
negotiators.’”63  While this direction was dicta that seemingly contradicts the 
Georgia-Pacific64 factors’ emphasis on placing the hypothetical negotiators at the 
time of infringement,65 its importance grew in subsequent patent cases. The Federal 
Circuit’s dicta regarding litigation licenses and facts not known to a negotiator 
created confusion about what new types of information could be introduced when 
assessing patent infringement damages.66 
The calculation of the reasonable royalty rate is crucial for both plaintiffs and 
defendants. Since it establishes the floor of what the plaintiff can receive as 
compensation, the most accurate and reliable method of calculating a reasonable 
royalty is often hotly contested in litigation.67 The Federal Circuit’s adoption of the 
Georgia-Pacific factors gave litigants a clear framework in which to operate when 
arguing for a particular reasonable royalty. However, when ResQNet suggested that 
litigation licenses and events not known by hypothetical negotiators could be used 
in reasonable royalty determinations, this framework was placed out-of-joint. 
C. The Scope and Limits of Privileges in Discovery 
Although parties to litigation are barred from discovering privileged information,68 
what constitutes privileged information can vary from circuit to circuit.69  Federal 
Rule of Evidence 501 gives federal courts the ability to define new privileges by 
interpreting “the common law . . . in the light of reason and experience.”70  “The 
common-law principles underlying the recognition of testimonial privileges can be 
 
 61. Id. at 872. 
 62. Id. at 873. 
 63. Id. at 872 (quoting Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 
1988)). 
 64. Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F. Supp. 1116, 1120 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (showing that 
the fifteen factors outlined by the court all imply that the hypothetical negotiation between the two parties take 
place before litigation occurs.).  
 65. SUNG AND SCHWARTZ, supra note 53, § 7:11.  
 66. Parker Kuhl, Rescue Me!: The Attack on Settlement Negotiations After ResQNet v. Lansa, 26 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 269, 269–70 (2011). 
 67. Merritt J. Hasbrouck, Protecting the Gates of Reasonable Royalty: A Damages Framework for Patent 
Infringement Cases, 11 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 192, 197 (2011) (“[T]he reasonable royalty calculation 
is the predominant methodology for calculating damages amount in patent infringement cases.”). 
 68. FED. R. CIV. PR. 26 (“Parties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is 
relevant. . . .”) (emphasis added). 
 69. See supra notes 77–96 and accompanying text. 
 70. FED. R. EVID. 501 (stating that the Constitution, federal statute, or federal rules of civil procedure may 
also provide privileges). 
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stated simply[:] . . . ‘the public . . . has a right to every man’s evidence’”71 and that 
the powers of Rule 501 striking information from public review are to be construed 
narrowly.72 The Supreme Court cautioned that privileges are often “in derogation of 
the search for truth.”73 In reviewing the potential privilege, the policy of the States,74 
the intent of Congress in passing the Rules of Evidence,75 the advice of the Advisory 
Committee of the Judicial Conference,76 and the public good are all brought to 
bear.77 
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. 
Chiles Power Supply78 applied the foregoing to establish a settlement privilege.  
Believing that the confidentiality of settlement served a “sufficiently important 
public interest,”79 the court cited two factors as persuasive in finding for a new 
privilege: (1) that there is an interest in “favor of secrecy of matters discussed by 
parties during settlement negotiations”80 and (2) that “confidential settlement 
communications are a tradition in this country.”81 It also relied on Rule 408’s 
qualified prohibitions of using negotiations at trial82 as support for restricting its 
discoverability. 
Within patent law, there is an exception to the general rule of precedent.  If the 
issue at bar (procedural or substantive) raises questions involving substantive 
patent law, the Federal Circuit’s precedent applies and not the regional circuit’s  
 
 
 
 
 71. Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 9 (1996). 
 72. Univ. of Pa. v. EEOC, 493 U.S. 182, 189 (1990). 
 73. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 710 (1974). 
 74. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12–13. 
 75. Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189. 
 76. Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13–14. 
 77. In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citing United States v. Gillock, 445 U.S. 360, 
375 (1980)). 
 78. 332 F.3d 976 (2003). 
 79. Id. at 980. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. FED. R. EVID. 408 (stating “evidence of [valuable consideration in compromising or attempting to 
compromise] is not admissible . . . either to prove or disprove the validity or amount of a disputed claim or to 
impeach”). But see Computer Assoc. Int’l, Inc. v. Am. Fundware, Inc 831 F. Supp. 1516, 1531 (D. Colo. 1993) 
(highlighting that Rule 408 does not “require exclusion of any evidence otherwise discoverable merely because it 
is presented in the course of compromise negotiations”), NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund v. Dept. of Justice, 
612 F. Supp. 1143, 1146 (D.D.C. 1985) (declining to find a settlement negotiation privilege in Rule 408). 
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precedent.83 The Federal Circuit has adapted and circumscribed the privileges 
related to attorney-client privilege84 and work-product immunity85 separate from 
any regional circuit. Settlement negotiations, however, were a matter of first 
impression for the Federal Circuit.86  Although, cases prior to ResQNet have 
suggested that settlement negotiations were discoverable,87 indicating that the 
Federal Circuit would side on the circuit split in favor of more liberal discovery 
standards.88 
The “most reliable license”89 and “panoply of events and facts”90 discussions in 
ResQNet produced a disjointed settlement negotiation privilege among district 
courts. Over the next two years, the circuits split (sometimes among district courts) 
in interpreting whether or not the Federal Circuit’s direction on remand allowed 
courts to use all settlement materials.91 
Over time, the circuits have trended consistently towards allowing discovery into 
negotiations.92 Even despite the Sixth Circuit’s adoption of a settlement privilege in 
Goodyear, other circuits have declined to extend the settlement negotiation  
 
 
 
 
 
 83. In re Spalding Sports Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803–04, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d 1747 (Fed Cir. 2000) 
(stating that “[i]n reviewing district court judgments, we apply the law of the circuit in which the district court 
sits with respect to nonpatent issues, but we apply our own law to issues of substantive patent law. . . .[A] 
procedural issue that is not itself a substantive patent law issue is nonetheless governed by Federal Circuit law if 
the issue pertains to patent law, if it bears an essential relationship to matters committed to our exclusive 
[jurisdiction] by statute, or if it clearly implicates the jurisprudential of this court in a field within its exclusive 
jurisdiction.”) (citation omitted). 
 84. See, e.g., Brigham and Women’s Hosp. Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 707 F. Supp. 2d 463, 470–71 (D. 
Del. 2010) (holding that the attorney-client privilege no longer applies when advice-of-counsel is used as a 
defense against a claim of inequitable conduct). 
 85. See, e.g., In re EchoStar Commc’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298–99 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (allowing discovery 
of work-product and usually privileged information in cases where an advice-of-counsel defense is asserted 
against a claim of willful infringement). 
 86. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
 87. In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209–10 (D.D.C. 
2005) (“Whatever else might be said about this legal landscape, it does not reflect a consensus of support for a 
settlement privilege in federal court.”). 
 88. See supra notes 78–88 and accompanying text. 
 89. ResQNet.com v. Lansa, 594 F.3d 860, 872 (Fed Cir. 2010).  
 90. Id.  
 91. Kuhl, supra note 66, at 282 (“[District courts] have reached varying and conflicting interpretations of 
the opinion. Some hold that ResQNet altered the admissibility of settlement licenses, while others claim that 
nothing has changed.”). 
 92. Wayne D. Brazil, Protecting the Confidentiality of Settlement Negotiations, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 955, 956 
(“[T]he weight of authority suggests that there is no generalized ‘privilege’ for settlement communications.”). 
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privilege.93 Over the years, different courts have ruled that negotiations are 
discoverable in order to review the fairness of settlement,94 to gather evidence of 
pre-existing knowledge of prior art,95 to show manipulation of energy prices,96 and 
to use third-party settlements in current suit.97 Each of these aforementioned cases 
reflects the court’s concern for disclosure when a negotiated settlement plays a large 
role in the course of a trial.98 Some courts have taken a middle-route, requiring a 
“particularized showing” that the requested evidence is likely to lead to admissible 
evidence.99 
The Eastern District of Texas, an incubator for patent procedure and litigation,100 
waivered back and forth between protecting settlement negotiations and allowing  
 
 
 
 
 
 93. For the few cases that have held for a settlement privilege, see Olin Corp. v. Ins. Co. of N. Am., 603 F. 
Supp. 445, 450 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (“These discussions were more than mere business communications . . . [they] 
constituted settlement negotiations to avoid the litigation of a potentially costly and complex suit.”); Allen 
Cnty. v. Reilly Indus., 197 F.R.D. 352, 354 (N.D. Oh. 2000) (denying motion to compel to prove bias); Cook v. 
Yellow Freight Sys., 132 F.R.D. 548, 554 (E.D. Ca. 1990) (“Indeed, there is a well established privilege relating to 
settlement discussions.”). 
 94. In re General Motors Corp. Engine Interchange Litig., 594 F.2d 1106, 1124 n. 20 (7th Cir. 1979) 
(stating “[We] find no convincing basis for [settlement negotiation privilege] here. . . . [Rule 408] is grounded 
on the policy of encouraging settlement of disputed claims without litigation. . . . [But parties] should be aware 
that the court will inquire into the conduct of negotiations.”). 
 95. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Mediatek Inc., No. C-05-3148, 2007 WL 963975, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 
30, 2007) (disagreeing with Goodyear) (rejecting plaintiff’s argument that there is a “federal settlement 
privilege” that “shields from discovery any communication created in the context of settlement negotiations”). 
 96. In re Subpoena Issued to Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n, 370 F. Supp. 2d 201, 209–10 (D.D.C. 
2005) (finding consensus for settlement negotiation privilege in neither federal nor state law). 
 97. California v. Kinder Morgan Energy Partners, L.P., No. 07-1883, 2010 WL 3988448, at *4 (S.D. Cal. 
Oct. 12, 2010). 
 98. In re EchoStar Comm’ns Corp., 448 F.3d 1294, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2006).  
 99. See, e.g., Bottaro v. Hatton Assoc., 96 F.R.D. 158, 160 (E.D.N.Y. 1982) (“Given the strong public policy 
of favoring settlements and the congressional intent to further that policy by insulating the bargaining table 
from unnecessary intrusions, we think the better rule is to require some particularized showing of a likelihood 
that admissible evidence will be generated by the dissemination of the terms of a settlement agreement.”); 
Butta-Brinkman v. FCA Int’l, Ltd., 164 F.R.D. 475, 477 (N.D. Ill. 1995) (requiring heightened showing 
requirements on public policy grounds). 
 100. The Eastern District of Texas is one of fourteen federal district courts across the country that is part of 
a federally mandated pilot program that seeks to increase expertise, efficiency, and consistency in patent cases. 
Pub. L. No. 11-349, “Pilot Program in Certain District Courts,” January 4, 2011 (“An Act to establish a pilot 
program in certain United States district courts to encourage enhancement of expertise in patent cases among 
district judges.”). See also “District Courts Selected for Patent Pilot Program,” United States Courts, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/news/newsview/11-06-07/District_Courts_Selected_for_Patent_Pilot_Program.aspx 
(Last accessed February 25, 2014) (“Fourteen federal district courts have been selected to participate in a 10-
year pilot project designated to enhance expertise in patent cases among U.S. district judges.”).  
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discovery.101 Eventually, the court consistently found that there was no special 
privilege in settlement negotiations, especially as they related to licensing issues.102 
As a bell-weather for patent litigation,103 the Eastern District represented the larger 
trend among federal courts to allow discovery in negotiations. 
III. The Court’s Reasoning 
In In re MSTG, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit denied104 MSTG’s writ 
of mandamus on two grounds: (1) that recognition of settlement negotiations 
privilege is not warranted105 and (2) the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
granting discovery of the settlement negotiations under review.106 
Before addressing the substantive issues, the Court established the acceptability 
of hearing mandamus in this case.107  It began by establishing jurisdiction,108 stating 
that determining whether information related to reasonable royalties can be 
disclosed “implicates the jurisprudential responsibilities of this court within its 
exclusive system.”109 It then stated that mandamus is available “only in 
extraordinary situations”110 where the petitioner “lacks adequate alternative 
means,”111 where there is a “novel and important question . . . [that] reflects 
substantial uncertainty or confusion in the district courts,”112 or where the 
 
 101. See, e.g., Software Tree, LLC v. Red Hat, Inc. 2010 WL 2788202, at *4 (E.D. Tex. June 24, 2010) 
(refusing to compel discovery of settlement agreements, stating “the Court declines to upset its traditional 
approach to this issue absent clear precedent compelling a new tack”); Tyco Healthcare Group LP v. E-Z-EM, 
Inc., 2010 WL 774878, at *2 (E.D. Tex. March 2, 2010) (allowing discovery of underlying negotiations, stating 
“a prior, related settlement agreement, where it exists, may be central to the fact-finder’s determination of 
damages”). 
 102. See, e.g., Charles E. Hill & Assocs., Inc. v. ABT Elec., Inc., 854 F. Supp. 2d 427, 428 (E.D. Tex. 2012) 
(“Before the Federal Circuit’s ResQNet decision in 2010, courts within this District generally applied the rule set 
forth in Goodyear, providing that settlement negotiations are privileged while the resulting license agreement 
itself is discoverable. The ResQNet decision has caused some shift away from Goodyear’s bright-line rule and 
toward the discoverability of settlement negotiations.”); Datatreasury Corp. v. Wells Fargo & Co., No. 2:06–
CV–72, 2010 WL 903259, at *2 (E.D.Tex. March 4, 2010)(stating that “[d]efendants’ concerns about the 
reliability of litigation-related licenses are better directed to weight, not admissibility”). 
 103. Julie Creswell, So Small a Town, So Many Patent Suits, N.Y. TIMES, September 4, 2004 (“What sets 
Marshall apart from its neighbors is a red-hot patent docket.”). 
 104. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1348. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. 
 107. Id. at 1341–42. 
 108. Id. at 1341 (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 265 F.3d 1294, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 
2001)) (“Federal Circuit law applies when deciding whether particular written or other materials are 
discoverable in a patent case.”). 
 109. Id. (citing Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., 265 F.3d at 1303). 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. (citing In Re Spalding Sports Worldwide, 203 F.3d 800, 804 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). 
 112. Id. (citing CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND 
PROCEDURE: JURISDICTION AND RELATED MATTERS § 3935.3 (2d ed. 1996)). 
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documents are “claimed to be protected by privilege or other interests in 
confidentiality.”113 The Court determined that the facts at hand fell under the final 
two categories, as the issue of whether settlement negotiations are privileged is one 
of first impression in the Federal Circuit.114 In addition, if the Court declined to hear 
MSTG’s case but a privilege should have existed, the confidentiality of the 
negotiations would be lost if review was denied until final judgment.115 
Having established the appropriateness of taking up MSTG’s mandamus 
petition, the Court then determined that there is no privilege in settlement 
negotiations.116  In order to recognize a privilege in settlement negotiations, the 
Court would have to invoke Rule 501 of the Federal Rules of Evidence, which 
authorizes the Court to “define new privileges by interpreting ‘the common law . . . 
in the light of reason and experience.’”117 It determined four factors identified by the 
Supreme Court that should be considered in “assessing the propriety”118 of defining 
a new privilege: (1) whether the policy decisions of the States suggest the 
recognition of a new privilege;119 (2) whether Congress has considered the privilege 
or related questions;120 (3) whether the list of evidentiary privileges recommended 
by the Advisory Committee of the Judicial Conference in its proposed Federal Rules 
of Evidence mentions the relevant privilege;121 and (4) whether the proposed 
privilege will “effectively advance a public good.”122 
The Court did not find any support for establishing a settlement negotiation 
privilege, citing examples from various levels of government. The Court first cites 
the lack of consensus among the states in a settlement negotiation privilege, 
contrasting it with the statutory mediation privilege passed by all 50 states.123 Then, 
it reviews the process by which Congress passed Rule 408,124 finding that Congress 
had an opportunity to protect settlement negotiations, but failed to do so. Thus, 
finding a settlement privilege “would require [the Court] to go further than 
Congress thought necessary to promote the public good of settlement.”125 Next, the 
 
 113. Id. (citing Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738 F.2d 587, 591 (3d Cir. 1984)). 
 114. Id. at 1342. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 1348. 
 117. Id. at 1342–3 (citing FED. R. EVID. 501). 
 118. Id. at 1343. 
 119. Id. (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 12–13). 
 120. Id. (citing Univ. of Pa., 493 U.S. at 189). 
 121. Id. at 1345 (citing Jaffee, 518 U.S. at 13–14). 
 122. Id. (citing In re Sealed Case, 148 F.3d 1073, 1076 (D.C. Cir. 1998)). 
 123. Id. at 1343 (citing Jay M. Zitter, Construction and Application of State Mediation Privilege, 32 A.L.R. 6th 
285, § 2 (2008)) (distinguishing this case by noting that the negotiations under review did not result from 
mediation but from negotiations between two sides without the assistance of a third-party mediator). 
 124. FED. R. EVID. 408. 
 125. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1344. 
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Court points out that the negotiation privilege was not included in the nine specific 
privileges recommended by the Advisory Committee.126 Lastly, the Court rejects 
MSTG’s argument that the privilege is needed to foster trust and confidence on 
grounds that the Supreme Court has declined to create new privileges for those 
reasons, and points to the success of settlements and compromises without a 
privilege in discovery.127 
The Court then outlined two policy reasons for not establishing a settlement 
negotiation privilege. First, there would need to be a crucial exception to the 
privilege issue when the settlement or its interpretation is the central issue.128 
Second, the Court identifies pre-existing mechanisms to limit the scope of discovery 
in order to protect the “sanctity of settlement discussions and promote the 
compromise and settlement of dispute,”129 including judicially imposed limits130 and 
protective orders.131 
Finally, the Court turns to whether allowing the negotiations to be discovered 
was an abuse of discretion by the District Court Judge.132 It determines that “as a 
matter of fairness MSTG cannot at one and the same time have its expert rely on 
information about the settlement negotiations and deny discovery as to those same 
negotiations,”133 and that MSTG made no reference to overly broad discovery. As 
such, the District Court did not abuse its discretion.134 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Allowing prior settlement negotiations to factor into the reasonable royalty rate is a 
positive advancement for patent litigation, regardless of lost privacy concerns. 
Discovery of settlement negotiations will help ground the reasonable royalty rate in 
reality and reflect the market value of patent infringement.135 Business transactions 
and negotiations have remained robust, despite earlier intrusions into lawyer-client 
 
 126. Id. 
 127. Id.  
 128. Id. at 1345 (citing the fact pattern in Portugues-Santana v. Rekomdiv Int’l, 657 F.3d 56, 63–4 (1st Cir. 
2011)). 
 129. Id. at 1346. 
 130. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(2)(C) (“[T]he court must limit the frequency or extent of discovery . . . if it 
determines that the discovery sought is unreasonably cumulative or duplicative . . . the party seeking discovery 
has had ample opportunity to obtain the information . . . or the burden or expense . . . outweighs its likely 
benefit.”). 
 131. Id. at 26(c) (stating that “a party or any person from whom discovery is sought may move for a 
protective order. . . . The court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party or person from annoyance, 
embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense”). 
 132. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1348. 
 133. Id. (referencing In re Pioneer Hi-Bred Int’l, Inc., 238 F.3d 1370, 1374–76 (Fed. Cir. 2001). 
 134. Id. 
 135. See supra Part IV-A. 
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privilege and there is no evidence that this decision will change the disposition of 
business.136 Finally, In re MSTG clarified prior confusion while re-emphasizing the 
pre-existing mechanisms for protecting truly sensitive information during 
discovery.137 
A. For Non-Practicing Entities, Settlements are the Market in which their Patents Gain 
Value, and the Discussions in Establishing that Market Should Be Discoverable. 
In the news and among legal commentators, there is a rising concern over non-
practicing entities (“NPEs”) or so-called “patent trolls.”138 NPEs exploit the value of 
their patent through enforcement rather than bringing the device or process to the 
market.139 A common practice is for the patent holder to send letters to potential 
infringers notifying them of the infringement, requesting payment for a continuing 
license, and threatening litigation.140 These letters are sent with the goal of receiving 
payments from the potential infringers in order to avoid litigation.141 In this way, 
the NPE, in essence, creates its own marketplace.142 
 
 136. See supra Part IV-B. 
 137. See supra Part IV-C. 
 138. Holly Forsberg, Diminishing the Attractiveness of Trolling: the Impacts of Recent Judicial Activity on Non-
Practicing Entities, 12 U. PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2011) (“[P]atent trolls are generally viewed as entities 
that force other innovative, enterprising companies into hostage-like situations resulting in the unsavory choice 
between expensive litigation, costly settlement, and potentially disproportionate licensing fees.”). However, 
commentators also point out the potentially inflammatory term “patent troll” and that not all Non-Practice 
Entities seek to aggressively stifle innovation to make money. In addition, it has been suggested that the term 
“Patent Monetization Entities” is a more accurate description of NPEs, on the grounds that it puts focus on the 
goals of the patent holders in owning the patent. Sara Jeruss, Robin Feldman, and Joshua Walker, The America 
Invents Act 500: Effects of Patent Monetization Entities on Litigation, 11 DUKE L. TECH REV. 357, 366–68 (2012). 
 139. Walter O. Alomar-Jimenez, Harmonizing Ebay, 1 U. PUERTO RICO BUS. L.J. 17, 23 (2010) (An NPE does 
“not manufacture products, but instead hold[s] patents, which they license and enforce against alleged 
infringers.”);”); Tejas N. Narechania & Jackson Taylor Kirklin, An Unsettling Development: The Use of 
Settlement-Related Evidence for Damages Determinations in Patent Litigation, 2012 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 
37 (2012) (NPEs are “‘companies in the business of buying up and enforcing patents.’ NPEs profit by 
purchasing patent rights and threatening alleged infringers with litigation over these patents”) (citation 
omitted); Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the Litigation of 
High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C.L. REV. 1571, 1578 (2009) (defining an NPE as a “corporate patent enforcement 
entity that neither practices nor seeks to develop its inventions”). 
 140. Victoria E. Luxardo, Towards a Solution to the Problem of Illegitimate Patent Enforcement Practices in the 
United States: An Equitable Affirmative Defense of “Fair Use” in Patent, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 791, 794 (2006) 
(stating that the “first state [of enforcement] consists of aggressive licensing fee extraction, typically coupled 
with an explicit threat of litigation if the fee is not paid”). 
 141. Alex S. Li, Accidentally on Target: The MSTG Effects on Non-Practicing Entities Litigation and Settlement 
Strategies, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 483, 511 (2013) (“If the parties reach an agreement, the NPE would receive 
some payoff amount, and the alleged infringer could continue to practice the patent without having to worry 
about potential litigation costs.”). 
 142. Id. at 489 (2013) (Noting that there are five different types of NPEs who use “litigation as a business 
model: . . . (1) small portfolio patent holders, (2) massive patent aggregators, (3) practicing entities with non-
practiced patents, (4) private research and development companies, and (5) offensive patent funds”). 
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When a patent’s only demonstrated market is prior litigation settlement 
licenses,143 the only evidence to support the existence of that market are the 
discussions and steps that determined the prior royalty price. This assists the fact-
finder in meeting the standards of reasonableness required. By putting in actual 
pre-existing negotiations involving the patent, the reasonable royalty hypothetical 
negotiation loses some of its guesswork and becomes more grounded in reality. 
The reasonable royalty rate, while expected to approximate reality, will never be 
reality. Indeed, litigants, juries, and judges’ ability to determine a reasonable royalty 
is frustrated further by the fact that a patent’s value is only determined over time in 
the market.144 Negotiated licenses often represent the thought and consideration 
market-representatives have put into the value of a given invention,145 and the 
underlying negotiations reflect the motivations and requirements of patent owners 
and their potential competitors.146 Most of the Georgia-Pacific factors are grounded 
in fact-based analysis of market conditions and relationships.147 The hypothetical-
negotiation is the furthest removed from such fact-intensive inquiry, and allowing 
actual negotiations to come into play brings the hypothetical more traditionally in-
line with the goals of Georgia-Pacific.148 
The importance of settlement negotiations in determining reasonable royalties is 
embedded in the very facts of In re MSTG. The reason the question of 
discoverability of settlement negotiations arose was because MSTG’s expert used 
those negotiations in determining his suggested reasonable royalty rate.149 By using 
the negotiations as a basis for his recommendation, the expert revealed the necessity 
of past business activity in determining reasonableness in damages. The issue 
 
 143. ResQNet, 594 F.3d at 872. 
 144. Jeffrey A. Maine, Xuan-Thao Nguyen, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TAXATION, 56 (2004). 
 145. ResQNet, 594 F.3d at 872. 
 146. Layne S. Keele, Res”Q”ing Patent Infringement Damages After ResQNet: The Dangers of Litigation 
Licenses as Evidence of a Reasonable Royalty, 20 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 181, 205 (2012) (stating that “[b]ecause 
the patent’s value represents a necessary consideration in reaching a litigation license, the cost of a litigation 
license can provide information about the patent’s non-litigation value to the parties of the license.”). 
 147. However, some factors do trend towards the subjective, such as the relationship between the parties or 
policies the patentee had against licensing. See, e.g. Bo Zeng, Lucent v. Gateway: Putting the ‘Reasonable’ Back 
into Reasonable Royalties, 26 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 329, 333 (2011). 
 148. See, e.g. Panduit Corp. v. Stahlin Bros. Fibre Works, Inc., 575 F.2d 1152, 1159 (6th Cir. 1978) 
(“Determination of a ‘reasonable royalty’ after infringement, like many devices in the law, rests on a legal 
fiction. . . . [T]he ‘reasonable royalty’ device conjures a ‘willing’ licensor and licensee, who like Ghosts of 
Christmas Past, are dimly seen as ‘negotiating’ a ‘license.’”); Fromson v. Western Litho Plate and Supply Co., 853 
F.2d 1568, 1575 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (The reasonable royalty methodology “encompasses fantasy and flexibility; 
fantasy because it requires a court to imagine what warring parties would have agreed to as willing negotiators; 
flexibility because it speaks of negotiations as of the time infringement began, yet permits and often requires a 
court to look to events and facts that occurred thereafter and that could not have been known to or predicted by 
the hypothesized negotiators”). 
 149. In Re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337 at 1340. 
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highlights the reality that, when a patent is yet to be proven on the market, past 
valuations at trial become an essential part of the value inquiry. 
B. In re MSTG Aligns Itself with the Goals of the Federal Rules of Evidence and the 
Trends of other Circuits while Connecting with Common-Law Standards of Reasonable 
Royalty. 
By incorporating settlement negotiations into the determination of reasonable 
royalties–especially in suits involving NPEs whose marketplace is essentially the 
courtroom and negotiating table–the Georgia-Pacific factors become tied to 
historical jurisprudence.150 Before the 1970s, the analysis of a reasonable royalty was 
broad and could include “any evidence” or market-based value.151 The Georgia-
Pacific test was created from modern case law, not grounded in the market-based 
reasonableness standard that was created from the common law.152 Looking to the 
reality of the marketplace, even one wholly defined through prior settlement 
negotiations, builds a bridge between common law jurisprudence and the tests and 
standards created since 1970s case law.153 
Allowing discovery of settlement negotiations promotes the goals of the Federal 
Rules of Evidence. The Rules promote a “broad and liberal policy of discovery for 
the parties to obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before 
trial.”154 In fact, Congress rejected creating explicit privilege categories in codifying 
the FRE, instead implementing Rule 501.155 Even then, a privilege towards 
settlement negotiations was not included.156 The legislative history implies that a 
settlement privilege either was not on the minds of legislators, was considered 
inessential to the concept of protection and privilege, or was counter to the goal of  
 
 150. E. Danielle Thompson Williams and Leslie T. Grab, Contemporary Issues in Patent Royalty Damages; 
TMI: How Much Settlement Information is Too Much Settlement Information?, PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE  
(Oct. 13, 2010) available at http://patentlawcenter.pli.edu/2010/10/13/contemporary-issues-in-patent-royalty-
damages. 
 151. Zeng, supra note 147 at 332. 
 152. Id. at 332–333. 
 153. Daralyn J. Durie & Mark A. Lemley, Intellectual Property Remedies: A Structured Approach to 
Calculating Reasonable Royalties, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 627, 628 (2010) (stating that the current fifteen-
factor test overloads the jury with factors that may be irrelevant and that “[w]ith fifteen factors, lawyers can 
make an argument that some combination of factors will support virtually any number an expert (or a jury) 
might come up with”). 
 154. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1346. 
 155. Brazil, supra note 92, at 991.  
 156. Id. 
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having parties gain full knowledge of the facts.157 Whether any of these reasons are 
true, the absence of a settlement privilege militates against a finding that such 
privilege is consistent with the Rules of Evidence.158 
ResQNet formally declared what individual circuits were already claiming: that a 
robust set of facts is essential to the determination of a matter and should not be 
occluded by novel constructions of privilege. The issue of settlement negotiation 
privilege has been percolating since the 1970s in suits where negotiations play a 
crucial role in the disposition of the issue.159 With the increase in patent litigation, 
the determination of value and worth is centering more and more on trial 
settlements.160 With this development, patent infringement cases have joined the 
rank of suits, such as class actions, in nearly depending on the role of the negotiator 
to settle disputes.161 In re MSTG brought settlement negotiations into their proper 
function in the determination of damages. 
Given that the reasonable royalty is the standard of patent damages, it becomes 
crucially important that the outcomes involving the same patent are the same from 
year to year. Reasonable royalties are the predominant measure of patent damages 
awards, representing more than 80% of awards over the last six years.162 One of the 
overarching goals of our judicial system is to produce determinations that are 
“predictable, replicable, vertically . . . and horizontally coherent.”163 Part of 
promoting coherence is assuring that similar issues–in this case reasonable royalties 
for a particular patent-in-suit–are treated with consistency. While each litigant may 
have different priorities from case to case, the enforceability of the patent 
theoretically remains the same, and a patentee places a certain base value to it. 
Providing evidence of previous negotiations and settlement licenses will establish  
 
 
 157. S. Rep. No. 93-1277, at 7052–54 (1974) (stating that in enacting 501, “it was clear that the content of 
the proposed privilege provisions was extremely controversial.” The privileges that were debated included state 
and official information privileges, the husband-wife privilege, doctor-patient privilege, attorney-client 
privilege, newsman’s privilege, and the application of state law privileges. The settlement privilege is not 
mentioned in the Senate Report). 
 158. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d 1337 at 1343–44. 
 159. In re General Motors Corp., 594 F.2d at 1124 n. 20. 
 160. Price Waterhouse Cooper, 2012 Patent Litigation Study at 11, available at http://patentlyo.com/media/ 
docs/2013/03/2012-patent-litigation-study.pdf [hereinafter “Litigation Study”]. 
 161. Jeruss, Feldman, and Walker, supra note 138 at 385 (noting that “the vast majority of [patent] cases 
settle.” In the groups study, “more than three-fifths of all cases . . . appear to have settled” with that number 
perhaps underreporting the number of settlements). 
 162. Litigation Study, supra note 160, at 11. 
 163. Karen M. Gebbia-Pinetti, Statutory Interpretation, Democratic Legitimacy and Legal-System Values, 21 
SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 233, 242 (1997). 
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more consistency from determination to determination when the same patents are 
involved.164 
C. The Benefits of Incorporating Settlement Negotiations for Businesses Outweigh 
Potential Losses of Privacy within Negotiations. 
In the Sixth Circuit’s Goodyear decision, the court voiced a concern raised by many 
courts that allowing the discoverability of settlement discussions would have a 
potential chilling effect on the parties’ willingness to enter into negotiations.165 
However, there can be benefits to both plaintiff and defendant in using negotiations 
during litigation. For defendant, settlement negotiations can prove the theoretical 
warranty, as well as provide evidence that plaintiff has fully recovered damages. 
Settlement negotiations may also provide a shield for defendants against litigious 
plaintiffs. In a suit involving a NPE plaintiff, who does not directly compete with 
the alleged infringer in the marketplace, it becomes difficult to evaluate a theoretical 
royalty. Settlement negotiations could also be used to the benefit of defendants in 
order to prevent double recovery.166 
The patent owner may also use the negotiation materials to prove that a 
suggested royalty rate is lower than acceptable. If a plaintiff appeals on damages 
grounds, he must prove that the royalty rate was unconscionably low.167 If past 
settlement licenses are part of the royalty rate, the patent owner could use the 
settlement negotiations as proof that the licenses were offered as a result of 
threatened ongoing litigation168 or that evidence “clearly shows that widespread 
infringement made the established royalty artificially low.”169 
Allowing settlement negotiations to factor into reasonable royalty rates provides 
businesses a way to continue using patented material in an economically-feasible 
way. In his analysis of the prior settlement agreements, MSTG’s expert noted that 
the settlement rate had been steeply discounted because litigation had not reached 
 
 164. Li, supra note 141 at 518 (Litigation as Business Strategy NPEs “would worry less about the 
discoverability of [] settlement-related documents in the future as they would be targeting large-scale alleged 
infringers that are of similar stature, making all of the settlement data rather similar and creating a relatively 
consistent reasonable royalty calculation”). 
 165. Goodyear Tires, 332 F.3d at 980 (“Parties are unlikely to propose the types of compromises that most 
effectively lead to settlement unless they are confident that their proposed solutions cannot be used on cross 
examination, under the ruse of ‘impeachment evidence,’ by some future third party. Parties must be able to 
abandon their adversarial tendencies to some degree.”). 
 166. See, e.g., Portugues-Santana, 657 F.3d at 63 (stating that the purpose of litigation is to make the injured 
party whole, but no more). 
 167. Rite-Hite, 56 F.3d at 1554. 
 168. John M.S. Kenyon, Christopher S. Marchese, John Land. PATENT DAMAGES LAW AND PRACTICE. 1:15 
Reasonable Royalty. 
 169. See, e.g., Nickson Indus., Inc. v. Rol Mfg. Co., 847 F.2d 795, 798 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
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any substantive rulings –no fault had been determined.170 Knowing whether such a 
discount is available at certain stages of litigation can influence whether the parties 
should continue litigation or settle.171 Evidence of prior practice in litigation on the 
part of the plaintiff will also help the defendant determine if they can negotiate a 
continuing royalty for the use of the potentially infringing technology.172 Expanding 
options of negotiation approaches can potentially facilitate economic viability of 
defendants who are innocent infringers with the ability to continue participating in 
the marketplace post-litigation.173 
In addition, the discoverability of prior negotiations provides a new strategic 
perspective to patent holders in the practice of peppering small or competing 
business with threats of litigation. Often, a patent holder will send a flurry of letters 
to potential infringers threatening to sue and offering immediate settlement, even if 
the potential to recover seems slight.174 Because the patent holder engages several 
potential defendants for infringing a particular patent, litigation with each 
defendant could have an effect on the others. So, “even if the expected value of the 
litigation at hand is negative, if the current litigation can make future litigations 
more profitable”175 through the interplay of other negotiations settlements, the 
patent holder can form a more complex, and potentially profitable, litigation 
strategy. However, with the knowledge that prior negotiations and settlements 
could be discoverable, a patent owner who wants to disguise his pattern or practice 
may hesitate knowing that his recipients have a mechanism for revealing the 
amounts of prior settlements.176 
 
 170. In re MSTG, 1339 F.3d at 1348. 
 171. Li, supra note 141 at 513 (“The more pre-litigation licensing agreements that the patent holder has on 
the patent-in-suit, the more likely the patent holder will settle the case.”). For the plaintiff with multiple prior 
settlements, further litigation resulting in invalidity “will destroy the entire income stream flowing from the 
patent.” Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Lawrence S. Pope, Dethroning Lear? Incentives to Innovate After 
Medimmune, 24 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 971, 982 (2009). 
 172. The extra assistance is essential in litigation with a non practicing entity. “For NPEs, the most 
important measure of damage is reasonable royalty because, by definition, they do not practice the patent and, 
therefore, have no lost profits; also, NPEs rarely can prove established royalty as they usually do not seek pre-
litigation licenses.” Li, supra note 141 at 493–94. 
 173. Known as “nuisance fee” economics, defendants will pay “not because of the economic value of the 
patent but in order to avoid the cost of determining liability and resolving a patent demand.” Id. at 514 (quoting 
Colleen V. Chien, Startups and Patent Trolls, at 6 (September 2012) (Santa Clara Univ. Legal Studies Research 
Paper No. 09-12), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2146251). 
 174. See, e.g., This American Life, When Patents Attack . . . Part Two!, original air date May 31, 2013, 
http://www.thisamericanlife.org/radio-archives/episode/496/when-patents-attack-part-two (recounting the  
business practice of Personal Audio, which sends letters to podcasters claiming the patent of podcasting and 
asking for a license for use).  
 175. Li, supra note 141, at 513. 
 176. Id. at 517 (“NPEs are likely to become more selective in their litigation strategies, possibly foregoing 
lawsuits against small-scale alleged infringers.”). 
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D. Concern over Loss of Privacy within Settlement Negotiations is Tempered by the 
Reality of Federal Circuit Trends and Continuing Application of Traditional Discovery 
Protections. 
Concerns that the discoverability of settlement negotiation threaten the privacy and 
usefulness of said negotiations are dispelled by the court’s continuing application of 
traditional procedural protections and the fact that negotiations and settlements 
still occur in a world where the Federal Circuit had already curtailed traditional 
discovery privileges.177 ResQNet had opened the door to a formal rule of permitting 
discovery of negotiations discovery178 and precedent was trending to establish a 
middle-ground rule that some negotiations are discoverable.179 This is not to say, 
that the court system is uninterested in providing coverage to litigating parties to 
negotiate in privacy and with discretion. There are mechanisms for lawyers to use to 
the advantage of their clients, including the Federal Rules of Evidence, private 
caucuses, and mediation. And then there are judicial mechanisms within judicial 
discretion to maintain the incentives to negotiate settlement, including limiting 
discovery and issuing protective orders.180 
Shrewd application of the rules of evidence can prevent prior settlement 
negotiations from public exposure, if not from the opposing party.181  Congress, in 
enacting Rule 408, adopted the Advisory Committee’s goal to protect settlement 
negotiations by limiting admissibility,182 thus protecting sensitive information from 
the public record. Rule 408 protects negotiations only related to disputed issues.183 
Lawyers on both sides of the courtroom can use Rule 408 to their advantage by 
focusing on disputed issues in negotiation, activating the interest in Rule 408 to 
promote out-of-court discussions and agreements over contentious issues. With 
this interest at play, lawyers can argue for the inadmissibility of any related 
negotiation communication, protect their client’s litigation policies and practices, 
and keep future opposing parties from knowing the discussions that produced the 
relevant litigation license. 
 
 177. See supra Part II-B. 
 178. 594 F.3d at 872–73. 
 179. See supra Part II-B. 
 180. In re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1346 (“The Supreme Court has instructed us that the federal courts ‘should 
not hesitate to exercise appropriate control over the discovery process’ to ‘prevent abuse.’”) (quoting Herbert v. 
Lando, 441 U.S. 143, 177 (1979)). 
 181. Although In re MSTG has held that negotiations are discoverable, the Court failed to address whether 
such negotiations were admissible. So far, district courts have held that Rule 408 governs the admissibility of 
negotiations, and guides the court to disallowing settlement negotiations on policy and reliability grounds. See, 
e.g. Narechania & Kirklin, supra note 139 at 22–24 (discussing courts’ analysis of settlement negotiation 
admissibility). 
 182. Id. at 11. 
 183. F.R.E.§ 408. For example, if an amount of lost revenue is already agreed on, and the parties are seeking 
to minimize it in order to end trial, such discussions will not be protected from later litigation. 
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In addition, lawyers may be wise to engage in private caucus settlement 
conferences for the protections of oral communications between parties.184  Private 
settlement caucuses are hosted by a judge or magistrate, who hears each side’s 
willingness to compromise and limits to settlement and then makes a suggested 
settlement between the two parties.185 By keeping the communications between 
parties at a minimum and funneling them through the court, each party remains in 
the dark about more sensitive matters, thus protecting them from adversarial 
inquiry and presentation at trial.186 
Finally, parties can turn to mediation to engage in litigation-ending negotiations 
and then take advantage of privacy guarantees within this particular process.187 
Private mediation sessions are often covered by state statute, which require 
confidentiality of all communications made within the course of mediation.188 In 
order to activate this protection, both parties usually need to agree in advance to 
keep communications private.189 Such an agreement would be drafted to include all 
relevant state provisions and expressly dictate the scope of confidentiality for all 
parties involved.190 Making a conscious decision to declare intent provides notice to 
all parties of the standards going forward in the mediation process, as well as 
provides support for future determinations of admissibility, especially in 
jurisdictions that require a heightened standard for discovery requests. However, 
prior settlement negotiations can also be used to benefit subsequent mediation,191 so 
the use of mediation to jealously guard royalty negotiations requires practitioners to 
project out, to anticipate whether or not negotiations could be an aid in future 
litigation. 
There are still mechanisms available to protect these negotiations when 
necessary.  The district court retains its discretion to limit discovery if the 
negotiations themselves are inadmissible, would not lead to admissible evidence, 
and were unused by the opposing party.192 Protective orders are available when there 
is adequate proof that active third-party settlements may be marred by discovery.193 
 
 184. See, e.g., Stephen E. Moss, Confidentiality in Mediation, 43-Oct. MD. B.J. 55, 56 (“[W]hat occurs from 
the inception to the conclusion of the mediation process is potentially confidential.”). 
 185. Brazil, supra note 92, at 1025–26. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Moss, supra note 184 at 56 (“If the matter is being litigated, a mediation communication may not be 
disclosed and disclosure may not be compelled ‘in any judicial, administrative, or other proceeding.’”) (citing 
Md. Rule 17-109(a)). 
 188. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN. CTS. AND JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS §§ 3-1801–1806 (also known as the 
Maryland Mediation Confidentiality Act).  
 189. Brazil, supra note 92, at 1024. 
 190. Id. 
 191. United Pet Group, Inc. v. MiracleCorp Products, 2012 WL 5392551, *1 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 5, 2012). 
 192. In Re MSTG, 675 F.3d at 1347. 
 193. Id. 
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These protections, of course, are pre-existing safeguards that apply to all potentially 
discoverable material, but have been proven adequate in the face of frequent use of 
settlement and negotiated agreements to end disputes.194 While shelving specific 
limits to settlement negotiation discovery for another day, the court did hint at 
requiring a “heightened”195 standard, which could be an additional tool for 
plaintiffs. 
V. CONCLUSION 
By declining to extend an evidentiary privilege to negotiations in patent-in-suit 
settlement licenses, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in In Re MSTG 
cured a circuit split in relation to patent cases and codified an overall trend towards 
allowing negotiations into the discovery process first mentioned in ResQNet.196 With 
settlement negotiations available for discovery, the hypothetical reasonable royalty 
rate becomes more grounded in reality when an established royalty is unavailable197 
and provides extra incentives and benefits to business owners on both sides of 
suit.198 
 
 
 194. Id. 
 195. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 196. See supra Part II. 
 197. See supra Part IV-A. 
 198. See supra Part IV-B & C. 
